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OPSOMMING
Die beskerming van belanghebbendes: die Suid-Afrikaanse sosiaal en etiek 
komitee en die Verenigde Koninkryk se ingeligte aandeelhouer waarde 
benadering: Deel II
In hierdie tweede deel van die artikel word die toepassing van CSR in
praktyk nagegaan, met die sosiaal en etiese komitee as Suid-Afrikaanse
model en die statutêre sosiaal en etiese komitee wat gebruik word in die
Verenigde Koninkryk. Ondersoek word ingestel of sodanige komitee, of ’n
statutêre benadering, soos vervat in artikel 172 van die VK
Maatskappyewet, verkieslik is.
* Continued from 2017 De Jure 17(1).
1 The Social and Ethics Committee
Sections 72(4), (8), (9) and (10) of the 2008 Companies Act provide as
follows:
72. Board committees. –
(4) The Minister, by regulation, may prescribe –
(a) a category of companies that must each have a social and ethics
committee, if it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to –
(i) annual turnover;
(ii) workforce size; or
(iii) the nature and extent of the activities of such companies;
(b) the functions to be performed by social and ethics committees required
by this subsection; and
(c) rules governing the composition and conduct of social and ethics
committees.
(8) A social and ethics committee of a company is entitled to –
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(a) require from any director or prescribed officer of the company any
information or explanation necessary for the performance of the
committee’s functions;
(b) request from any employee of the company any information or
explanation necessary for the performance of the committee’s functions;
(c) attend any general shareholders meeting;
(d) receive all notices of and other communications relating to any general
shareholders meeting; and
(e) be heard at any general shareholders meeting contemplated in this
paragraph on any part of the business of the meeting that concerns the
committee’s functions.
(9) A company must pay all the expenses reasonably incurred by its social
and ethics committee, including, if the social and ethics committee
considers it appropriate, the costs or the fees of any consultant or
specialist engaged by the social and ethics committee in the performance
of its functions.
(10) Section 84 (6) and (7), read with the changes required by the context,
apply with respect to a company that fails to appoint a social and ethics
committee, as required by this section and the regulations.
1 1 Composition and Appointment
Regulation 431 deals with the social and ethics committee as referred to
in section 72 of the Act.2 
This regulation applies to all state-owned companies, public
companies that are listed3 or any other company that complies with
1 In terms of section 223 and Item 14 of Schedule 5 of the 2008 Companies
Act the Minister of Trade and Industry publishes regulations relating to the
functions of the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, the
Takeover Regulation Panel and the Companies Tribunal, and other matters
relating to the regulation of companies. 
2 This requirement is in line with King III recommendations. Principle 1.1 of
King III states that the board should provide effective leadership with an
ethical foundation, which includes the responsibility to promote the
stakeholder-inclusive model of corporate governance. Principle 8 of King IV
concerns committees of the governing body and Recommended Practices
68-70 deal with the social and ethics committee. Paragraph 50 deals with
disclosure in relation to this committee. King IV especially expands on the
ethics role of this committee. It recommends that this committee should
expand beyond mere compliance to contribute to the creation of value
(page 29).
3 Reg 43(1). The fact that state-owned companies and public companies that
are listed must, automatically, have social and ethics committees seems to
imply that it is accepted that these companies comply with the criteria in s
72(4)(a)-(c). While this may be true in respect of listed public companies, it
does not follow logically in respect of state-owned companies. Section 72(4)
requires expressly that the three criteria (or one of them) must be present
and the type of company is irrelevant. To apply the section, by way of
regulations, automatically to certain types of companies does not seem to
comply with the powers to make those regulations as in s 72(4): See
Henochsberg 277 but also De Lange ‘The social and ethics committee in
terms of the 2008 Companies Act: Some observations regarding the
exemptions and the role of the Companies Tribunal’ 2015 SA MercLJ 507-
539.
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certain criteria.4 A public interest score of more than 500 points (in any
2 of the preceding 5 financial years) will be relevant in this regard. The
‘public interest score’ is calculated at the end of a financial year as the
sum of a number of things. It is the aggregate of the number of points
equal to the average number of employees of the company during the
financial year (contract workers are annualised over the particular
financial year); one point for every R1 million (or portion thereof) in third
party liability of the company, at the financial year end; one point for
every R1 million (or portion thereof) in turnover during the financial year;
and one point for every individual who, at the end of the financial year,
is known by the company, in the case of a profit company, to directly or
indirectly have a beneficial interest in any of the company’s issued
securities; or, in the case of a non-profit company, to be a member of the
company, or a member of an association that is a member of the
company.5 The public interest score is thus a method used to determine
whether a company must comply with enhanced accountability
requirements based on its social and economic impact.
A minimum of three directors or prescribed officers6 must serve on a
company’s social and ethics committee. At least one must be a director
who has, at least for the previous three financial years, not have been
involved in the day-to-day management of the company’s business.7
From the literature available it seems if there is some disagreement as
to the exact legal status of this committee. In Henochsberg it is argued
that the social and ethics committee is not a board committee, but a
separate organ of the company.8 It is stated that, based on an
interpretation of the Regulations, the committee is a company
4 Reg 43(1)(c).
5 Regulation 26(2). Certain companies are exempted, such as when the
company is required in terms of other legislation to have, and does have,
some form of formal mechanism within its structures that substantially
performs the function that would otherwise be performed by the social and
ethics committee (section 72(5)(a)) and if it is a subsidiary of another
company (as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act) and if the holding
company has a social and ethics committee that will perform the functions
of the social and ethics committee for the (subsidiary) company (Regulation
43(2)(a)). If a company is required to appoint a social and ethics committee,
it may apply to the Companies Tribunal in the prescribed manner and form
for an exemption and the Tribunal can give such an exemption for five
years if it is satisfied that it is not reasonably necessary in the public
interest to require the company to have a social and ethics committee,
having regard to the nature and extent of the activities of the company
(section 72(5)(b)). This exemption is problematic as the same criteria
(quantitatively) that require a company to appoint a social and ethics
committee must be used to determine whether it is not necessary, in the
public interest, to do so. It is suggested that the nature of the activities (i.e.
a qualitative criterion) should be applied in the exercise of the discretion by
the Tribunal, as the quantitative criteria are fixed by the public interest
formula: See Henochsberg 278.
6 As defined in ss 1, 66(1) and Regulation 38.
7 See Reg 43(4).
8 See Henochsberg 276.
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committee and not a board committee. Also, the social and ethics
committee has a responsibility to report to the shareholders, but must
only draw the attention of the board to certain matters.9 Furthermore, it
is argued that the Act empowers the board to delegate additional
functions to the audit committee, a provision that is not present in
respect of the social and ethics committee.10 Joubert, on the other hand,
argues that it is a board committee based on the short title of section 72
and the overall context of section 72 of the Companies Act.11 It is clearly
of importance whether the social and ethics committee is a board
committee or not. If it is a board committee then the board can delegate
certain powers and authority to the committee. This will be in addition
to those listed in the Act. If it is a company committee then it will only
have the powers and authority as provided for in the Act and Regulations.
This also has an impact on the standard of conduct and the liability of the
members of this committee, as board committee members are, in the
case of directors, subject to the same duties as directors, as will be
discussed later.12 
1 2 Functions
The division of power between the shareholders and the board of
directors is relevant when considering the functions of the SEC. The two
(main) organs of the modern company are the general meeting (meeting
of shareholders) and the board of directors.13 The Act provides that the
business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the
direction of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the
powers and perform any of the functions of the company, subject to the
extent that the Act or the company’s memorandum of incorporation14
provides otherwise.15 The Act therefore introduced a shift in ultimate
9 Henochsberg 276; Regulation 43(5)(b).
10 See s 94(7) (i) of the 2008 Companies Act.
11 Joubert 190, footnote 33, or at best a ‘hybrid’ committee. See also Locke
109, footnote 371 where she argues that Regulations 43(2) and 43(3) must
be read together to mean that the board has the power to appoint members
of the social and ethics committee and Cassim (man ed) Contemporary
Company Law 417. This view is shared by Wixley and Everingham
Corporate Governance (2015) 79.
12 See section 76 on the partial codification of directors’ duties. This section is
equally applicable to prescribed officers or members of board committees:
s 76(1) (a) and (b).
13 See Henochsberg 276 on the arguments in favour of the social and ethics
committee being a company committee and not a board committee. The
audit committee is also appointed by the shareholders and therefore also
an organ of the company. See s 94 and Henochsberg 277, 356 and on board
meetings see s 73 and Henochsberg 280. See Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade
Corporate law (2000) 83 for the significance of the distinction between
organs and agents.
14 Hereafter the MOI.
15 See s 66(1).
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power in the company from the shareholders to the board.16 The board
of directors now has the ultimate power in the company, subject to the
Act and the MOI. Therefore where the Act provides that ‘the company’
must act, that would now be the board of directors and not the
shareholders (collectively), unless the Act makes it clear that the opposite
will apply.17 This provision on the shift in power from the shareholders
to the board of directors has some serious consequences. 
Ultimate (indirect) control of a company is usually in the hands of the
shareholders as they have the power to appoint and remove directors.
The level of protection that shareholders receive in terms of the 2008
Companies Act is, however, different compared to the 1973 Companies
Act as shareholders no longer have an original decision-making power.
This is due to the enactment of section 66. Section 66(1) apparently
creates a positive duty on the board of directors to manage the company
as it provides that the business and affairs of the company must be
managed by or under the direction of its board. It also means, due to the
use of the words ‘business and affairs’, that the ultimate power is no
longer with the shareholders in general meeting, unless otherwise stated
in the Act or the MOI.18 The powers of the directors are now given by
statute and not delegated or derived from an agreement between the
shareholders and the directors. The ultimate responsibility for good
corporate governance thus lies with the board of directors.19 
The significance of the power to manage the business and affairs in
terms of section 66 is twofold. The power is now original and no longer
delegated from the shareholders. This shift from the previous position
also happened in Canada, one of the models for the Act, and the
significance thereof was summarised as follows: ‘The directors’ power is
original, not delegated: as such, it is not subject to controls by the
shareholders, except as specified in the applicable statute.’20 This is also
true with regard to South Africa. This means, inter alia, that the
shareholders no longer have the inherent residual power to take a
16 See s 66(1). See Henochsberg 250(1) for a detailed discussion of s 66. It is
uncertain to what an extent management functions can be excluded in the
MOI or transferred to the shareholders to perform. See s 15(1) that provides
that the provisions in the MOI must be in line with the Act; otherwise it
would be void in so far as it is inconsistent. Also the directors owe the
fiduciary duties to the company, and it will not make sense to give the
shareholders the majority or all of the managerial powers because the
directors can transfer their powers to the shareholders, or anybody else for
that matter, but not their duties. It is also unclear how the shareholders will
give effect to the full managerial function, as they will not have access to all
the company records and accounts. See the discussion in Henochsberg
250(4). 
17 See s 75, as one example, where the ultimate power is with the
shareholders.
18 Henochsberg 250(5); Delport ‘The division of powers in a company’ in:
Visser and Pretorius (eds) Essays in Honour of Frans Malan (2014) 81-92 91. 
19 This is different from the position in the United Kingdom, which is more in
line with the position of the 1973 Companies Act. See Cilliers et al 88.
20 Welling Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (2006) 315.
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decision in case of a deadlock. This principle was, however, not applied
consistently in the Act, and section 81(1)(d) refers to the deadlock ground
as a ground for the winding-up of a solvent company. In Henochsberg it
is stated that ‘if the directors are in deadlock, the power to take over the
powers of the directors does not transfer to the shareholders as the
‘highest’ authority in the company’. The same principle applies if the
MOI or Act does not provide who must exercise the power.21 
Secondly, the ultimate power is now in the hands of the board of
directors and no longer with the shareholders. Therefore, unless the
qualifications of section 66 are complied with, the board of directors is
now the ultimate organ of the company. The significance of this is that
the shareholders, as erstwhile ultimate holders of authority and power,
cannot at common law ratify any actions by the directors beyond their
authority or in transgression of their duties in acting on authority of the
shareholders, except to the extent that the Act or the MOI expressly
provides otherwise. 
Also, statutory provisions can provide that the ‘company’ can or may
do certain things.22 It is thus important to determine whether the board
or the shareholders will act as the company. Based on section 66(1) it
seems that the default position is that ‘the company’ now refers to the
board of directors and no longer to the shareholders. Thus, ‘if the board
acts, the company acts’. 
The committee has reporting as well as monitoring duties. It has to
monitor the company's activities, having regard to any relevant
legislation, other legal requirements or prevailing codes of best practice23
with regard to certain matters. These matters include social and
economic development, good corporate citizenship, the environment,
health and public safety, consumer relationships and labour and
employment issues. 
The committee has to consider matters relating to the company’s
social and economic development and this will include the company’s
standing relating to the goals and purposes as provided for in the United
Nations’ Global Compact Principles, the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation recommendations on corruption, the Employment Equity
Act24 as well as the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act.25
21 Henochsberg 332.
22 See e.g. s 78.
23 Monitoring a company’s standing in respect of the codes and legislation
expressly listed is, however, not enough. Full compliance will only be
attained if the company’s standing is monitored with reference to all
relevant codes and legislation. Joubert 189. See also Stoop 2013
Stellenbosch Law Review 562–582 and Havenga ‘The social and ethics
committee in South African Company law’ 2015 Journal of Contemporary
Roman Dutch Law 285-292 in respect of the functions of the social and
ethics committee.
24 Act 55 of 1998.
25 Act 53 of 2003.
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Matters relating to good corporate citizenship also fall within their
mandate and here reference is made to, inter alia, the promotion of
equality, the prevention of unfair discrimination and the reduction of
corruption. Further matters within their mandate include environmental,
health and public safety issues as well as consumer relationships. Finally
labour and employment is also listed and here reference is made to the
International Labour Organization Protocol on decent work and working
conditions.26
The committee is also entitled, but not obliged, to report annually to
the shareholders at the company's annual general meeting on the
matters within its mandate.27
The committee is also tasked with developing and monitoring a
human rights management policy and system. On environmental, health
and public safety the committee has a general duty to consider the
impact of the company’s activities and of its products and services. The
committee is then also tasked to determine and monitor the company’s
standing in terms of the goals and purposes of the BBBEE Act. They
should also monitor the company’s activities relating to its consumer
relations and this includes advertising, public relations and compliance
with consumer protection legislation.28
A few remarks are appropriate with regard to the functions of the
committee. First, the functions given to this committee are very wide and
clear guidance on what is expected from this committee is not
provided.29 Specific terms of reference are not provided.30 They can, for
example, claim any costs or fees31 for appointing consultants and
experts, but they do not have the power to make appointments.32 If the
committee is a board committee, as discussed above, the board can give
them this power. If not, the existence of this power is in doubt.
Secondly, as stated above, the committee should monitor the
company’s activities, having regard to all relevant legislation and codes
as well as other legal requirements, and this is not just in relation to
matters of a social nature as it extends to a wide range of issues like the
environment, health and public safety. All relevant legislation, codes etc
are not listed in the Regulations and a notable omission is King III.
26 For a detailed discussion on ‘labour’ and the Protocol in this context see
Locke 111-112.
27 Section 72(8)(e). This may be an additional indication that the committee is
a company committee rather than a board committee, because if it’s the
latter, reporting should be only to the board.
28 See Locke 109 -118 for a detailed discussion of the function and duties of
the committee with reference to the aspects mentioned in the Regulations.
29 See Kloppers 166, 187 and Joubert 188.
30 Kloppers 166, 188.
31 Section 72(9)
32 Section 72(8).
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Reference to national applicable instruments would have been
preferred.33 Knowledge of the relevant legal position concerning these
fields is thus necessary. It basically covers all dimensions of social
responsibility, sustainability and corporate citizenship.34 The wider the
scope of the duties of committee members the more unlikely that people
will be willing to serve on such committees.35 Joubert36 argues that the
task of identifying the relevant codes and legislation and performing the
required monitoring and reporting functions in respect of the specific
matters listed is quite an onerous task. 
Thirdly, when considering the various matters that fall within the
mandate of the committee it is abundantly apparent that the precise
nature of these matters and the extent that the committee must pay
attention to it is not clear. Herewith a few examples: The meaning of
‘social and economic development’ as one of the matters that the
committee must monitor and report on, is unclear.37 Kloppers38 argues
that the committee should focus more on social development as opposed
to economic development, as the last mentioned is already dealt with by
the audit committee.39 However, just because another committee
already deals with an issue does not necessarily mean that the social and
ethics committee does not have to pay attention to the issue if it falls
within its statutory mandate. Also, reference is made to the Employment
Equity Act40 in the context of ‘social and economic development’, but it
is not clear whether the social and ethics committee should take
responsibility for employment equity matters and the employment
equity plan (as required by the Employment Equity Act). If it is argued
that the social and ethics committee must take responsibility for these
matters, and thus have more than a mere oversight function, then it can
intrude with the functions of other board committees.41 Furthermore, a
clearer definition of ‘health’ and ‘public safety’42 would have been
beneficial. It is not clear whether it only concerns occupational health,
the health of consumers etc.
1 3 Appraisal
Some of the uncertainties with regards to this committee have already
been touched upon above. The first issue concerns the appointment of
this committee and whether or not it is a company committee or a board
committee. We are of the view that the most convincing argument, in
33 Kloppers 2013 PER 166 187.
34 Kloppers 180 argues that it is not unusual to include matters like these
under ‘social and ethics’, but then clear guidance is needed of what exactly





39 Kloppers 172 and footnote 22.
40 Act 53 of 2003.
41 Kloppers 178.
42 Regulation 43(5)(a)(iii).
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favour of the fact that it is a company committee and not a board
committee, is the fact that the committee has the right, in its discretion,
to report back to the shareholders. This is wider than their responsibility
to simply draw certain matters to the attention of the board.43 It is clearly
important how one classifies this committee. If it is a board committee
then the members will have the same duties as directors. If it is a
company committee then it is not the case and the members are only
subject to the functions and powers as stated in the Act and the
Regulations. The importance of this distinction is that if the committee is
not a board committee, without any fiduciary duties as directors and/or
prescribed officers in terms of the common law or the Companies Act,
towards the company, it can make recommendations to the board, and
also report to the shareholders, on matters and in a manner that is not in
the interest of the company. In this sense the committee is in the same
position as the shareholders who, as organ of the company, do not have
fiduciary duties towards the company.44 Recommendations to the board
for implementation would, obviously, be subject to the fiduciary duties of
the board. However, if the board cannot or will not implement those
recommendations, due to their fiduciary duties, a recommendation to
the shareholders can result in removal of the board in terms of section
71, as neither the committee nor the shareholders have any fiduciary
duties towards the company. 
Secondly, on the functions of this committee, it was discussed above
that clear terms of reference are not provided and that committee
members will most probably be unclear as to what is precisely expected
from them. Their functions will also, most definitely, overlap with some
of the functions of the other committees, for example the remuneration
committee, which is a board committee, in respect of employment
issues. In this sense most of the duties and responsibilities of the social
and ethics committee fall within the duties and responsibilities of the
board in any case as the board has to take all the interests of stakeholders
into account when acting for the benefit of the company.45 None of the
‘stakeholders’ as listed in regulation 43 can, directly or by implication, be
excluded from the attention of the board in the exercise of its duties. To
require the committee to merely report to the board on the matters as
outlined in the regulations would be counter-productive, as the board
would, in most if not all instances, already have knowledge thereof or will
be alerted thereto by e.g. the company secretary or other management
divisions within the company, such as labour developments by the
human resources department, consumer issues by the legal and
compliance department and so forth. Both the social and ethics
committee and the audit committee also have an interest in
sustainability disclosures and assurances.46 In addition, many of the risk
43 Henochsberg 276.
44 See Henochsberg 276 and Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate law
(2000) 83.
45 See discussion under para 4.1 supra.
46 Joubert 194, footnote 55.
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issues that fall within the mandate of the audit committee, at least from
a King III perspective and requirements, are also the responsibility of the
social and ethics committee, such as the monitoring of and reporting on
issues such as corruption. From a practical perspective this overlap is not
effective. Two committees will thus report back to the board on the same
issues. These committees may also have different views on the matters
that they report on. From a cost perspective, the company has to
remunerate members of different committees attending to the same
matter. The different committees can, presumably, first talk to each
other informally before they report back to the board to ensure that they
do not provide conflicting views, but this will not solve the cost issues and
this modus operandi is unacceptable per se from a corporate governance
viewpoint due to, inter alia, lack of formal procedures and
documentation. Also if the same members serve on both committees
they will basically just meet once with two agendas. It is thus very
important that a company provides, as far as it is practically possible,
very clear terms of reference for each of its committees, within the ambit
of the Act and the Regulations, and also taking into account the functions
performed by the executive management and other divisions in the
company. In practice the biggest danger has been shown here that the
social and ethics committee may want to dictate to management and
other divisions in the company as to the work to be done by the latter for
the company or for the social and ethics committee. This is clearly
untenable and should not be allowed. However, due to the uncertainties
as to the exact role and function of the social and ethics committee, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to manage this situation effectively in a
company.47
Thirdly, the function of the social and ethics committee to report to the
shareholders, as mentioned above, is most probably the biggest
challenge. This can be explained as follows: In terms of Regulation
43(5)(c) the committee may report, through one of its members, to the
shareholders at the company’s annual general meeting on the matters
within its mandate. If the committee brings a matter before the board,
the board has to make a decision based on its duties towards the
company. In other words they must act in the best interest of the
company. If the committee is not a board committee, without any
fiduciary duties, in terms of the common law or the Companies Act,
towards the company as discussed above, it can make recommendations
to the board, and also report to the shareholders, on matters and in a
manner that is not in the interest of the company as defined above. If the
board, however, does not implement the matter brought under their
attention then the social and ethics committee can report back to the
47 A cursory study of arbitrarily chosen companies such as Steinhoff
International Ltd and Sanlam Ltd and the reports by the chairmen of these
companies in the annual reports, show that there is no consistent
application in respect of the social and ethics committee. 
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general meeting of shareholders as this is a matter that falls within their
mandate. The shareholders can of course not implement the decision,48
but they can remove a specific director or even all the directors elected
by shareholders. This ultimate power of shareholders in respect of
directors could affect the discretion of the board in respect of the
implementation of a matter reported on by the social and ethics
committee.49 In other words the shareholders can enforce CSR through
the reporting function of the committee as they can determine the
structure of the board. This can create tension between the board of
directors and the general meeting and the committee. The reporting to
the shareholders can also have the opposite effect from what is
envisaged. This will be because the shareholders, in exercising their
powers as shareholders, such as voting rights, have no duty, fiduciary or
otherwise, towards the company or any other stakeholder for that
matter. They will therefore, possibly, only take their own interests into
account, and not even that of the company. This will therefore have the
effect that the interests of the company as a separate entity, as well as
that of the other stakeholders, are negated. If the shareholders are
inclined to act in a manner that supports e.g. CSR or other interests, it
may have a positive effect, but this is, at present at least, ‘soft law’
established and applied through codes.50
Locke states that the committee plays a supportive role to the board in
addressing stakeholder issues as the committee has to draw matters
within its mandate to the attention of the board.51 As stated above, most
of these matters will be within the knowledge of the board in any case
and this proposed function does not add anything. In view of the above
it can be argued that the committee can have a bigger and more
controversial role, possibly unplanned and hopefully unintended by the
legislator.
The basic principle is, however, that all the functions that fall within
the ambit of the committee are actually also matters that the board
should take into account in complying with its fiduciary duties towards
the company. If the intention with the committee was merely to act as a
conduit to the board and to sensitize the board about these matters, so
that the board can properly consider the matters in conjunction with
other interests, it is submitted that it would have been an important
addition to the governance structure of the company. The powers of the
committee, as well as the composition thereof with the minimum
representation of one director, coupled with the powers of the committee
to approach the shareholders, clearly indicate that it was not the
intention of the legislature for the committee to merely assist the board.
48 Section 66.
49 Henochsberg 279.
50 It is beyond the scope of this article to give an exposition of these codes
and the effect thereof. See in respect of institutional investors the Code for
Responsible Investment in South Africa and a discussion thereof in Esser
and Delport 2016 Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 27-28.
51 As per Regulation 43(5)(b). See Locke 110.
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2 Conclusions on the South African Social and 
Ethics Committee
We are of the view that provision for the social and ethics committee is,
in principle, a good initiative to give effect to the interests of
stakeholders. As stated before, the role of directors is to make a profit for
the company. When doing this they need to have regard to the interests
of various stakeholders. In the end they need to make a decision that is
best for the company as a separate legal entity. By having a committee
that addresses the board on issues that are relevant when making
business decisions should place directors in a better position to make the
best decision for the company. However, as discussed above, there are
various shortcomings and uncertainties with this committee. Its terms of
reference are not clear enough. There is uncertainty as to whether this is
a board committee or a company committee and this have various
implications, for example, with regard to the liability of the members of
this committee. The tension that can be created between the board and
the shareholders is also problematic based on the fact that the committee
should report back to the shareholders, as explained above. We are,
however, still of the view that a committee like this is preferred to a
legislative pluralist approach. But then it should be drafted with more
certainty and its shortcomings should be addressed.
Joubert states that listed companies have already showed an
awareness of social and sustainability issues in their public reporting.52
Empirical research is obviously not available on how effective this
committee is, but when considering the top 10 listed companies on the
JSE it is clear that all of these companies have a social and ethics
committee, as required by the Act, in place.53 Procedurally it therefore
seems if companies are starting to comply. Substantially, only time will
tell whether this monitoring and reporting role on a wide selection of
matters will actually result in better corporate socially responsible
behavior and companies that are sustainable and good corporate
citizens. It is, however submitted, that although the aims and functions
of the social and ethics committee should at least, as argued above,
sensitize the board in respect of the interests and importance of other
shareholders, there are a substantial number of material legal issues, as
discussed above, that will impact negatively on the ultimate effect of this
committee. 
52 According to a KPMG study the percentage of the hundred largest
companies listed on the JSE reporting on corporate responsibility increased
from 18% in 2005 to 97% in 2011. See Joubert 183, footnote 1. See https:/
/www.kpmg.com/PT/pt/IssuesAndInsights/Documents/corporate-responsibi
lity2011.pdf for the study (accessed 2017-11-07).
53 For the Top 40 listed companies see https://www.jse.co.za/current-
companies/companies-and-financial-instruments. 
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3 A Comparison with the Stakeholder Approach 
in the United Kingdom
3 1 Introduction
In 1998 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry announced a three-
year fundamental review of core company law in the United Kingdom.
This review was led by an independent steering group. Their aim was to
develop a simple, modern, efficient and cost-effective framework to
carry out business activity in Britain for the twenty-first century.54 
In the course of the review process, various consultation documents
were drafted.55 A detailed discussion of the review process is not within
the scope of this article. The aim is to discuss the stakeholder approach
taken in the United Kingdom with the intention to compare it with the
South African approach, discussed in Part 1 of this article.56 The
protection of stakeholders is one of the issues that received considerable
attention during the United Kingdom company law review process.57
The Steering Group, ‘for ease of reference’, referred to two basic
approaches as far as company interests and the stakeholder debate are
54 See Attenborough ‘The Company Law Reform Bill: an analysis of directors’
duties and the objective of the company’ 2006 Company Lawyer 162–169
where he discusses the company law reform of the United Kingdom as
undertaken by the Steering Group. For a discussion of the company law
review in the UK, see: Rickford ‘A history of the company law review’ in De
Lacy (ed) The Reform of United Kingdom Company Law (2002) 3–37,10.
55 The Strategic Framework; Developing the Framework; Completing the
Structure; the Final Report and the White Paper of 2005. See also Modern
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Reforming the Law concerning
Overseas Companies (October 1999); Company Formation and Capital
Maintenance (October 1999); Company General Meetings and Shareholder
Communication (October 1999); Capital Maintenance Other Issues (June
2000); Registration of Company Charges (October 2000); Trading Disclosures
(October 2000). 
56 See De Jure 17(1). See Lombard and Joubert ‘The legislative response to the
shareholders v stakeholders debate: a comparative overview’ 2014 Journal
of Corporate Law Studies 211-240, 211 for a discussion of different models,
legislative and otherwise, in various jurisdictions.
57 The interests of the employees as stakeholders have received legislative
attention by the Labour government as early as 1980, when the Companies
Act of 1980 in s 46 provided that the directors shall have regard to the
interests of employees, but that such employees will not be able to enforce
those duties directly. See Gower, Prentice and Pettet Gower’s Principles of
Modern Company Law (1992) 73. This movement was also attempted in
South Africa, albeit it with a somewhat different modus operandi, but with
the same lack of success. See Botha Employee Participation and Voice in
Companies: A Legal Perspective (LLD Thesis 2015 North-West University) for
a detail discussion of the development in South Africa.
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concerned, namely the so-called enlightened shareholder value approach
and the pluralist approach.58 They summarised the two different
approaches as follows: 
A distinction is drawn between the enlightened shareholder value approach,
which asserts that [productive relationships] can be achieved within present
principles, but ensuring that directors pursue shareholders’ interests in an
enlightened and inclusive way, and the ‘pluralistic’ approach, which asserts
that co-operative and productive relationships will only be optimised where
directors are permitted (or required) to balance shareholders’ interests with
those of others committed to the company.59 
The Steering Group seems to strongly favour the so-called enlightened
shareholder value approach.60 
The Companies Act of 2006 provides for a comprehensive code of
directors’ duties and sections 171–177 set out their general duties. The
scope of the general duties is listed in section 170 which states that the
duties specified in sections 171–177 are owed to the company by the
directors. The general duties are based on certain common law rules and
equitable principles. These duties should be interpreted and applied in
the same manner as common law rules and equitable principles.61
Section 172 concerns the duty to promote the success of the company
and is of importance for purposes of this article. These factors include
that directors should have regard to the likely consequence of any
decision in the long-term; the interests of the employees; the need to
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others; the impact of the company’s operations on the community
and the environment; the desirability of the company maintaining a
reputation for high standards of business conduct; and the need to act
fairly as between members of the company.
3 2 Section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006
Section 172 of the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 provides as
follows:
172. Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith,
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the
benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst
other matters) to –
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
58 See the Strategic Framework p 37, par 5.1.11. It has been stated that the
enlightened shareholder value approach has a strong emphasis on
shareholder primacy and the pluralist approach on the protection of
stakeholders. 
59 The Strategic Framework p iv, par 5.
60 The Strategic Framework p 39, par 39; p 42, par 5.1.23; pp 43, par 5.1.25
ff.
61 Section 170(4). 
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(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers,
customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the
environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high
standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or
include purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1)
has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for
the benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes.
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or
rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act
in the interests of creditors of the company.
3 2 1 Explanation of Section 172
It is stated in the Explanatory Notes on the Act that this section enshrines
in statute the enlightened shareholder value approach by stating that a
director must promote the success of the company with reference to a
number of important factors. With regard to subsection (1) it is explained
that the list of factors is not exhaustive, but highlights areas of particular
importance, which reflect wider expectations of responsible business
behaviour, such as the interests of the company’s employees. Directors
have to determine, with the necessary care and skill, which factors are
relevant at what stage of the existence of a company. Subsections (2) and
(3) are explained as follows in the Explanatory Notes: 
Subsection (2) addresses the question of altruistic, or partly altruistic,
companies. Examples of such companies include charitable companies and
community interest companies, but it is possible for any company to have
‘unselfish’ objectives which prevail over the ‘selfish’ interests of members.
Where the purpose of the company is something other than the benefit of its
members, the directors must act in the way they consider, in good faith,
would be most likely to achieve that purpose. It is a matter for the good faith
judgment of the director as to what those purposes are, and, where the
company is partially for the benefit of its members and partly for other
purposes, the extent to which those other purposes apply in place of the
benefit of the members. Subsection (3) recognises that the duty to promote
the success of the company is displaced when the company is insolvent.
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides a mechanism under which
the liquidator can require the directors to contribute towards the funds
available to creditors in an insolvent winding up, where they ought to have
recognised that the company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding
insolvent liquidation and then failed to take all reasonable steps to minimise
the loss to creditors. It has been suggested that the duty to promote the
success of the company may also be modified by an obligation to have regard
to the interests of creditors as the company nears insolvency. Subsection (3)
will leave the law to develop in this area.62
62 See pars 325–322 of the Explanatory Notes on the Act. The Steering Group
was against the inclusion of creditors as beneficiaries of directors’ duties.
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3 2 2 Shareholder Primacy Retained
In terms of this duty embedded in section 172, directors are primarily
expected to act in good faith to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole.63 In other words, shareholder
primacy has been retained. However, the directors may also have regard
to other matters, including and primarily those listed in section
172(1)(a)–(f). As was mentioned above, this list is not exhaustive.64 The
list provided in section 172(1) is probably the most comprehensive list of
factors that directors should consider when managing a company
contained in any modern company legislation. It is also, probably, the
clearest recognition in modern company legislation of the importance of
interests apart from the interests of shareholders, namely those of other
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers and others.
3 2 3 The Practical Application of Section 172
The practical application of this section is, however, unclear. This
uncertainty can be explained as follows: firstly, directors are provided
with an unfettered (or unlimited) discretion in terms of this provision.
They should manage a company in a way they consider would promote
the success of the company, for the benefit of its members. But there are
no objective criteria indicating how they should exercise this important
discretion. According to the Ministerial Statements of June 2007, there are
two ways of looking at the statutory statement of directors’ duties. On the
one hand, it codifies the existing common law obligations of company
directors. On the other hand, it marks a radical departure in ‘articulating
63 See Esser and Du Plessis ‘The stakeholder debate and directors’ fiduciary
duties’ 2007 SA MercLJ 346, 353 and Richardson ‘The Companies Act
2006, directors’ duties and the onset of insolvency’ 2007 Insolvency Law &
Practice 138. See further Wesley-Key ‘Companies Act 2006: are cracks
showing in the glass ceiling’ 2007 International Company and Commercial
Law Review 422–429 arguing that s 172(1) does not provide stakeholders
with sufficient protection. The duty to consider the interests of stakeholders
is still subjective. Miles ‘Company stakeholders’ 2003 The Company Lawyer
56–59 also argues that it is within the discretion of the directors whether to
consider other stakeholders or not. See also Attenborough ‘Recent
developments in Australian corporate law and their implications for
directors’ duties: lessons to be learned from the UK perspective’ 2007
International Company and Commercial Law Review 312 317 stating that s
172(1) does not appear to represent a great movement away from
shareholder value. Section 172(1) places merely a general obligation on
directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders. Shareholders are
still the primary beneficiaries of directors’ duties. See further on s 172:
Cerioni ‘The success of the company in s. 172(1) of the UK Companies Act
2006: towards an ‘enlightened directors’ primacy?’’ 2008 OLR 1 17; Fisher
2009 ICCLR 12; Keay ‘Moving towards stakeholderism? Enlightened
shareholder value, constituency statutes and more: much ado about little?’
2011 EBLR 1, 33-36; Lynch ‘Section 172: A ground-breaking reform of
director's duties, or the emperor's new clothes?’ 2012 CoLaw 196 201.
64 See Nakajima ‘Whither ‘enlightened shareholder value’?’ 2007 The
Company Lawyer 353–354 stating that the statement of directors’ duties is
not an exhaustive list.
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the connection between what is good for a company and what is good
for society at large’.65 
Secondly, it is stated that the new statutory statement of directors’
duties captures a cultural change in the way in which companies conduct
their business. The Act is based on a new approach to pursue the
interests of shareholders and considering the interests of stakeholders.
These approaches are complementary approaches and not contradicting
ones. It is stated in a ‘Corporate Update’ by Ashurst 66 that section 172(1)
will at least have the effect of making directors think harder about their
duties. 
Thirdly, the list of issues directors need to have regard to is also not
exhaustive. It is specifically stated that directors need to consider these
issues ‘amongst other matters’. There is no indication of what these
‘other matters’ entail. Fourthly, there is no definition concerning ‘the
success of the company’.67 
Fifthly, none of the stakeholders other than shareholders will have
standing to compel directors to take their interests into consideration,
unless it can be established that the interest of the company itself was
contravened. This will have to be done by way of a shareholder derivative
action (in terms of the derivative action in sections 260–264 of the
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006).68
The extent of the protection afforded in section 172(1) is therefore
uncertain. It would seem that the only practical consequence of
recognising these other interests in the legislation is that the actions of
directors would not be open for any challenge if they have not only taken
65 See the introduction to the Ministerial Statements of June 2007 available at
http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-369-5991?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (accessed
2017-11-07).
66 See the ‘Corporate update’ of Ashurst of November 2006 on the Companies
Act of 2006. 
67 Keay ‘Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an interpretation and
assessment’ 2007 The Company Lawyer 106 109.
68 In England and Wales referred to as ‘derivative claims’ (s 260 CA 2006ff)
and in Scotland as ‘derivative proceedings’ (s 265 CA 2006ff). This was one
of the dilemmas employees faced under s 309 of the United Kingdom
Companies Act of 1985. See Du Plessis & Dine ‘The fate of the draft fifth
directive on company law: accommodation instead of harmonisation’ 1997
Journal of Business Law 23, 46; Roach ‘The paradox of the traditional
justifications for exclusive shareholder governance protection: expanding
the pluralist approach’ 2001 The Company Lawyer 12, 15. It has been said
that one effect of s 309 was to dilute directors’ accountability to
shareholders rather than to strengthen their accountability to employees.
Section 260 sets out the key aspects of a derivative claim. There are three
elements to a derivative action: (1) the action must be brought by a
member of the company; (2) the cause of action is vested in the company;
and (3) relief is sought on the company’s behalf. Section 260(3) provides
that a derivative claim ‘may be brought only in respect of a cause of action
arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company’. 
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the interests of the company as a whole (defined as the collective interest
of the current and future shareholders) into consideration in making
decisions, but also other interests. Under the common law, other
interests, such as employees’ interests, were considered to be pertinent
only when they coincided with the company’s best interests.69 
3 2 4 Conclusions on Section 172
The drafters can be commended for clearly stating which approach they
prefer regarding the stakeholder debate. The Act seems to provide a
theoretical answer to the stakeholder debate, but its practical application
is far from clear. It may well be that over time guidelines on its practical
application may be provided.70 The Strategic Report is another method
of ensuring that directors comply with their duties. During 2013
regulations were issued relating to the Strategic Report and Directors’
Report. Section 414A of the Companies Act now requires all companies
that are not small71 to prepare a Strategic Report. The Report must, to
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development,
performance or position of the company’s business, include— (a)
analysis using financial key performance indicators, and (b) where
appropriate, analysis using other key performance indicators, including
information relating to environmental matters and employee matters.72
Section 415 of the Act requires all companies to prepare a directors’
report.73 Section 418 deals with the contents of the Directors’ Report
relating to a statement as to disclosure to auditors. Both the Strategic
Report and the Directors’ Report are integral parts of the annual report.
The purpose of the strategic report is to inform members of the company
and help them to assess how the directors have performed their duty
under section 172 of the Act.74 
The Act clearly refers to the interests of other stakeholders and to the
fact that directors should have regard to the interests of other
69 Hampson v Price’s Patent Candle Co (1876) 45 LJ Ch 437; Hutton v West Cork
Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654. 
70 Section 172(1) CA 2006 has thus far mainly been mentioned in the context
of the application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings and
shareholder’s remedies, e.g. unfair prejudice petitions (s 994) and
derivative (shareholder) actions on behalf of the company. See for a
detailed discussion on case law referring to s 172: Chałaczkiewicz-Ładna
The Relevance of Long-term Interests in the Decision-Making Processes of
Company Directors in the UK, Delaware and Germany: a Critical Evaluation
(PhD Thesis 2016 University of Edinburgh) para 4.2. E.g. Lesini v Westrip
Holdings [2010] BCC 420 421 where the court held that in most cases
courts will not challenge directors’ subjective judgments.
71 A company is entitled to small companies exemption in relation to the
strategic report for a financial year if – (a) it is entitled to prepare accounts
for the year in accordance with the small companies regime, or (b) it would
be so entitled but for being or having been a member of an ineligible group.
See s 414B of the Companies Act, 2006.
72 Section 414C (4).
73 Section 416 deals with the general contents of the Report. 
74 Section 414C (4). 
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stakeholders when promoting the success of the company for the benefit
of its members.75 Thus the Act is very clear on the preferred approach to
stakeholders’ protection. Shareholders should still be seen as the primary
beneficiaries of company’s management in comparison to other
stakeholders. But directors have a discretion in this regard.76 Directors
should only consider the interests of these stakeholders when it would be
in the interests of the shareholders collectively to do so. 
The Australian and Market Advisory Committee77 stated that a non-
exhaustive list of stakeholder interests provides directors with little
guidance as how to balance these competing interests. They argued that
in the interest of certainty it would be more beneficial if the ‘best
interests of the company’ is interpreted to include the interests of
stakeholders. Others argue that section 172 provides more clarity on the
determination of what directors may consider as being the interests of
stakeholders.78 They argue that the section provides directors with
general and structural guidance on how to balance the interests of
stakeholders.
In short the advantages of the broad nature of section 172 are that it
is adaptable and flexible. The disadvantage is that it does not give
meaningful indications to directors as to what these interests entail.79
4 Conclusions
Based on the above analysis, the position in the United Kingdom and
South Africa can thus be compared as follows:80
75 Section 172(1) of the Companies Act of 2006.
76 Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Chester Overseas Ltd [2014] EWHC 2692 (Ch)
para 66-68 (Stephen Jourdan QC) confirms that the test in s 172 is a
subjective one. See also Re Southern Countries Fresh Foods Ltd [2008]
EWHC 2810 (Ch) para 53 (Mr Justice Warren) confirming that it is a task for
the directors, and not for the court, to decide what constitutes the best
interest of the company. The case also stresses the subjectivity of the duty
to promote the success of the company.
77 CAMAC Report on Social Responsibility of Corporations (2006) available at
http://www.asx.com.au/resources/newsletters/listed_at_asx/20070221_cam
ac_report_the_social_responsibility_of_corporati.htm (assessed on 2016-
11-01).
78 Horrigan CSR in the 21st Century (2010) 232ff.
79 Wilkinson Will Social and Ethics Committees Enlighten Shareholders? A
Comparison of the South African provisions relating to Social and Ethics
Committees with the Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach in the United
Kingdom Companies Act 2006 (LLM Dissertation 2011 University of
Johannesburg) at 67.
80 The headings used for this comparison are based, but adapted, on those
used by Wilkinson.
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It is clear from the literature that the common law shareholder
supremacy doctrine is being questioned. A movement away from that
doctrine will change the roots of company law fundamentally. However,
it must also be accepted that the doctrine cannot remain absolute and
that its reach should be tempered but it should also be recognised that a
pluralist approach would, for all intents and purposes, make managing
companies by directors virtually impossible. Using ‘soft law’, such as
codes, to at least shift the focus of the management of the company to
Comparison 
Points:





The SEC: Their role is not to 
protect stakeholders per se, but 
to highlight the interests of the 
stakeholders to the board.
Board: Stakeholder interests 
within discretion of directors as 
long as in the best interests of 
the company. Mixture of 
shareholder primacy and 
inclusive approach in the Act.
Approach not clear, but clearly 




of directors as to what to 
consider when making a 
decision that would most 
likely promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of 







SEC: Not required to balance 
interests, SEC must merely 
monitor and report.
Advantage: Directors have an 
independent report that can 
assist with their decisions and 
the various stakeholders being 
affected by the decision.
Board: Stakeholders should be 
taken into account based on 
interpretation of Companies 
Act as a whole, but the primary 
focus is shareholder benefit 
based on the wording of s 76. 
This is not clear from the 
Companies Act, 2006. No 
guidance on this.
Within subjective discretion 
of directors.
Enforcement No direct rights to stakeholders 
in legislation (i.e. in s 76), so 
would expect no remedies.
However: many remedies also 
available to stakeholders, 
especially employees and also 
section 218(2).
Stakeholders do have a right 
in section 172, but no direct 
remedy in the Act.
Unenforceable (subjective) 
duty of a director.
Reporting Not in the Companies Act.
But King III: Integrated 
Reporting recommendation. 
Part of JSE Listings 
Requirements (8.63).
Strategic Report: ss 414A, 415 
and 418 of the Companies 
Act.
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also recognise other interests more clearly will work, but only in respect
of socially responsible companies, but the enforcement thereof is
problematic and lies in the hands of a secondary ‘regulator’ like a stock
exchange, the investors in that company and the shareholders voting
with their feet. There are, however, many companies that have an effect
on a wide range of stakeholders, where these ‘duties’ cannot be enforced
as above due to the fact that the shares are not listed. 
The stakeholder position in the United Kingdom is still very much
based on shareholder primacy. The interests of stakeholders will really
only be attended to if it coincides with those of the shareholders
collectively and is, it is submitted, an imperfect system and solution as it
does not change the common law, but merely affirms it. 
South Africa’s legislative approach to the protection of stakeholders is
not clear but a move away from shareholder primacy can, however, not
be denied. A committee such as the social and ethics committee is
therefore in line with this approach and, in principle, a welcome move.
The social and ethics committee therefore seems to be an attempt to
ensure that the interests of other stakeholders are directly recognised by
the company and by the board, but in a manner that shies away from the
amendment of the relevant common law rules which influences its
efficacy. It will, however, only be successful and be able to protect the
interests of stakeholders (in line with an inclusive approach) if the
material legal deficiencies, uncertainties and shortcomings, discussed
above, are addressed. Failure to do so will have the effect that the impact
of the social and ethics committee will not only be negated, but that it
will also cause tensions in the management of a company, and between
different stakeholders, that can paralyse the company. We are
nevertheless of the view that a structure like the social and ethics
committee is perhaps the more sensible process to protect stakeholder
interests and to assist directors to consider these interests when they
make business decisions, but then the terms of reference and the duties
and functions of this committee should be drafted in much clearer terms.
The matters that fall within the mandate of the committee are most
probably issues that the board would consider in any event, but to have
a committee reporting back to the board and not just the board merely
‘going through the list’ is arguably a better way to make sure that all
interests are adequately addressed. A properly constituted social and
ethics committee and the proper functioning of such a committee will
also indicate the possible pitfalls and dangers if and when a legislative
move towards a pluralist approach is contemplated or deemed
necessary.
